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In Uridu Hallan, Doreya, a middle-aged 
Egyptian upper class woman, wants to 
divorce her husband. Since her only son 
had grown up and had just left the pa-
rental home in order to study abroad, 
she decided that the time was ripe to 
divorce her unfaithful, alcoholic, and 
abusive husband whom her father had 
forced her to marry twenty years earlier. 
When she requested him to divorce her 
he refused, saying that he could not 
understand that she suddenly wanted a divorce after twenty years of 
marriage unless “her eye was on another man.” As 
a consequence, Doreya was left no other choice 
then to file a divorce case in court. Her case was 
endlessly postponed and she found herself divid-
ing her time between work and going to the court 
without any results. As her case dragged on, she 
became more interested in learning the difference 
between women’s divorce rights in Islam as com-
pared to the divorce rights she had as an Egyptian 
Muslim woman under the Egyptian legal system. 
She discovered that Islam gives women the right 
to divorce their husband unilaterally through a 
procedure called khul‘. One day, she found the po-
lice at her door—sent by her husband—to force 
her back to the marital “home” through a so-called 
“ta‘ah” (obedience) ordinance. Instead of returning 
“home” Doreya ran down the stairs and fled to her 
brother’s apartment.1 There she met a friend of her 
brother and after a while they fell in love. Slowly 
Doreya started getting hopes for a new future.
Yet, the “obedience” ordinance had angered her 
to such an extent that she decided to make an ap-
pointment with the Minister of Justice. During her 
visit she told him about the “khul‘ hadith” in which 
a woman approached the Prophet telling him that 
she hated living with her husband although she 
thought of her husband as a good and 
religious man. The Prophet asked her 
if she was willing to give back to him 
the mahr (dowry) which he had given 
her upon marriage. She agreed, and 
after she returned it to her husband, 
the Prophet divorced her from him. 
The Minister of Justice was impressed 
by her knowledge of Islamic law and he 
promised to study the matter. He abol-
ished the “obedience” ordinance in the 
sense that the police was no longer al-
lowed to force a woman back “home.”2 
However, he did not give women the 
right to divorce by way of khul‘, nor did 
he set out to facilitate the existing di-
vorce procedures so as to put an end to 
a practice which made women spend 
years in court without necessarily ob-
taining a divorce at the end of that pe-
riod as happened to Doreya. After four 
long years the judge refused to grant 
her a divorce. Instead of marrying the 
friend of her brother whom she was in 
love with, she was still legally married 
to a man whom she hated and from 
whom she had already been separated 
for years.
Finally there was khul‘
In actuality Doreya is a character 
played by Fatin Hamama (1931- ), one 
of Egypt’s most famous actresses. Re-
leased in 1975, Uridu Hallan (I Want a 
Solution) had a profound influence on 
the public and many claimed that it revived the reform initiatives of the 
old Personal Status Laws which had last been amended in the 1920s. 
It is difficult to measure its effects, but it is beyond doubt that the film 
reflected the mood of the seventies in which hope, when a new reform 
proposal was introduced, and disappointment, when it was rejected 
again, succeeded each other. While the reform initiatives of 1971, 1975, 
and 1977 were all rejected by Parliament, Sadat pushed through a re-
form of Personal Status Law in 1979 during a period of parliamentary 
recess. The new law aroused a lot of controversy and especially the fact 
that women were given automatically the right to a divorce in case their 
husband married a second wife, enraged religious leaders, as well as 
the general public. However, since Sadat had issued the law when Par-
liament was in recess, some lawyers appealed the constitutionality of 
the law in the High Court which declared it unconstitutional on formal 
grounds in May 1985. The High Court did not declare the law uncon-
stitutional on the ground that its content violated the Sharia. Although 
in July 1985 a new, adapted version of the 1979 law (law no.100/1985) 
was accepted by the Parliament, women felt disappointed. They again 
set out to reform Personal Status Law. 
Where in the film, Doreya went to visit the Minister of Justice in order 
to ask him to change the “obedience” ordinance and urge him to intro-
duce unilateral divorce by way of khul‘ instead, more than a decade 
later, women’s activists also went to see the Minister of Justice, in order 
to discuss how they could facilitate the procedures governing judicial 
divorce cases initiated by women. After years of working with the Min-
istry of Justice, government officials, well known lawyers, and religious 
authorities, the women’s activists made a big step forward when the 
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In the mid 1970s, a film, Uridu Hallan (I Want 
a Solution), drew attention to the plight of 
women applying for divorce under Egyptian 
law. Three decades later, Egyptian women 
are the first in the Middle East to have gained 
the right to unilateral divorce through a 
procedure called khul‘. Cartoons and two films 
now depict khul‘ as a law designed mainly 
for immoral westernized Egyptian women 
from the upper classes.
If only there was 
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Cartoons appeared 
to provide a very 
popular means for 
those opposing 
reform of divorce 
rules to express 
their criticism of the 
new “khul‘ law.”
A woman 
tells her new 
lover: “Just a 
minute please... 
I will divorce 
my husband 
(through khul') 
and come to you 
immediately!” 
 Al Wafd 
Newspaper, 
8 February 
2000
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People’s Assembly passed Law no. 1/2000 on the Reorgani-
zation of Certain Terms and Procedures of Litigation in Per-
sonal Status Matters.3 Soon the law became known as the 
“khul‘ law” after one of its 79 clauses which allowed for a 
khul‘ without the consent of the husband. According to 
this interpretation of khul‘: “A married couple may mutually 
agree to separation. However, if they do not agree and the 
wife sues demanding it; separates herself from her husband 
by forfeiting all her financial legal rights; and restores to him 
the sadaq (dowry) he gave to her, then the court is to divorce 
her from him” (article 20).
The “khul‘ law” criticized
In contrast to what one might expect, khul‘ was criti-
cized by many defenders of women’s rights, one of whom 
was Husna Shah, the scriptwriter of I Want a Solution. In an 
interview in an Egyptian newspaper in 2000 she said that 
khul‘ will only be used in case of extreme necessity since the 
wife will have to forgo her financial rights such as alimony. 
For this reason, a woman will hesitate to approach a court. 
Husna Shah even predicted that women who do not opt for 
khul‘ but who continue to live in discordant marriages, will 
resort again to “the cleaver and the plastics bags,” a refer-
ence to criminal cases in which women, unable to obtain a 
divorce, ended up murdering their husbands.
Husna Shah did not stand alone in her criticism. Other pro-
ponents of women’s rights also were of the opinion that khul‘ 
would only be an option for richer women since they were 
the only ones likely to be able to pay back the dower as well 
as give up their financial rights. Opponents of reform of the 
existing divorce rules articulated much fiercer criticism. They 
also stated that giving women unilateral divorce rights would lead to sky-
rocketing divorce rates, and hence the destruction of the Egyptian family 
since women were too emotional to be given this right. As long as women 
remained obedient to their husband, family life and society in general 
would prosper. However, when women would leave their husband and 
ask for a khul‘, this would lead to the breakdown of the Egyptian family 
and, hence, to that of Egyptian society at large. Often opponents called 
women applying for khul‘ nashiz (disobedient). 
Cartoons appeared to provide a very popular means for those oppos-
ing reform of divorce rules to express their criticism of the new “khul‘ 
law.” They depicted women with moustaches, women flirting with 
other men, men in shackles and men pushing prams, all conveying the 
same message: once women were giving the right to unilateral divorce, 
they would misuse it. As a result Egyptian family life would fall apart. 
What is particularly interesting is that many, if not all, cartoons depict-
ed women as westernized Egyptian women who did not wear the veil, 
but instead wore tight garments and who walked on high heels.
The issue of westernization and women’s (dis)obedience was also a 
central theme in two films which dealt with the development of khul‘ 
after its introduction in 2000. Both films were comedies and in both 
cases they showed how two women from the higher classes tried to 
divorce their husbands. The first film, Muhami Khul‘ (Khul‘ Lawyer) was 
released in 2003 and showed how a young and attractive woman of 
the high heels and tight clothes type, who owned a factory wanted 
to divorce her husband because he was snoring. For this purpose she 
approached a lawyer who accepted her case but only on the condition 
that they would construe snoring as sexual impotence, otherwise they 
would have no chance of winning the case.4 During the process they 
(not surprisingly) fell in love with each other. She won the case but in 
the end the two did not marry each other after she caused a scandal 
by swimming in her bikini in the river which ran along the house of his 
parents in the village. 
The title of the second film Uridu Khul’an (I Want Khul‘) is a pun on the 
film Uridu Hallan and was released in late 2005. Again, we see how an 
upper class woman with two children resorts to khul‘ in order to pres-
sure her husband to give her permission to leave the house in order to 
work again. He had refused to let her work after he had come home 
one afternoon only to find out that his two children had changed the 
house into a chaos during his wife’s absence. Since he thinks that her 
main responsibility is in the house, he refuses to let her work again 
after which the wife files the first khul‘ case in the country. The media, 
eager to cover this first khul‘ case, starts to cover her case in every na-
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Cartoon 
from Al Wafd 
Newspaper 
foresees that, 
after the 
passing of the 
new Personal 
Status Law, 
women will 
be in control, 
27 January 
2000.
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tional paper and on television. As a consequence the husband, afraid 
of his high position, becomes so embarrassed that he starts to give in 
to her wishes bit by bit. 
Both the cartoons and the two films use the imagery of westernized 
Egyptian women to suggest that khul‘ is only in the interest of already 
liberated and immoral rich elite women who will only use it for frivo-
lous reasons. In fact, however, the majority of those filing for a divorce 
through khul‘ are Egyptian women from the lower middle classes who 
do not wish to divorce their husband merely because they snore or be-
cause they forbid them to work, but because their lives have in some 
way been made impossible. Many of these women have husbands 
who do not have jobs and refuse to work, or husbands who have left 
them for another woman without divorcing them, thereby forcing 
them to run the household alone and to work outside the house as 
well as making it impossible for them to remarry. In such cases it is 
ironic that husbands frequently react to their wife’s khul‘ case by filing 
an “obedience” ordinance. Apart from attempting to save their honour 
by putting the blame on their wife, they hope to make it difficult for 
her to obtain a divorce or they hope that the “obedience” ordinance 
will scare her to such an extent that she will withdraw her case. 
The problems of these women are not easily recognized as the main 
discourse still relates khul‘ to women’s disobedi-
ence and consequently the destruction of the 
Egyptian family. Approximately 35 years after 
Doreya’s Uridu Hallan Egyptian women are in a 
position to say Uridu Khul‘an. The relationship be-
tween khul‘ and disobedience, however, makes 
filing for a divorce through khul‘ a stigmatizing 
experience. What is more, this problem is not lim-
ited to a small group of westernized elite women 
as most women who resort to khul‘ are from mod-
est backgrounds. 
Notes
1. When a wife left the marital home without 
her husband’s permission he was legally 
permitted to force her home by police force.
2. It was really abolished in 1967.
3. For more information, see Diane Singerman, 
“Rewriting Divorce in Egypt: Reclaiming 
Islam, Legal Activisim, and Coalition Politics,” 
in Remaking Muslim Politics, Democratization 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 
161-188.
4. This clearly goes against the idea of the 
“khul‘ law” of 2000 under which women no 
longer need to prove that they have “valid” 
reasons for divorce.
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Back in his student days, the young 
Douwes worked his summer holidays 
in a factory in order to finance his 
travel to the Middle East. On one of his 
journeys in Syria, while travelling from 
Aleppo to Abu Kamal, he met on the 
bus a dealer in used car parts who in-
vited him to his house in Salamiyya, a 
rural town to the southeast of Hama. 
Martijn: There, you found out that this 
man, as most of the inhabitants, was 
an Ismaili whose grandparents had 
migrated from the coastal mountains 
to the inland plains in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Dick: Yes, he was not a religious man 
and was often dressed like the Arab 
nomads with whom he traded spare car parts. As an M.A. student I was 
primarily interested in the migration to and re-cultivation of the areas 
adjacent to the Syrian steppes. In the process I happened to stumble 
on the curious history of the recognition of the Bombay-based Aga 
Khan by a part of the Syrian Ismaili community at the end of the nine-
teenth century. The problems ensuing from that recognition, includ-
ing the trial for treason of their religious shaykhs, caught my attention. 
My later Ph.D. research aimed at examining the non-mainstream Mus-
lim communities in the closing decades of Ottoman Syria, but dur-
ing my research in the Syrian National Archives I discovered unique 
material on the rural crisis of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries and decided then to elaborate on that topic. 
Martijn: Coincidence may have played its part in your career but the Ismai-
lis (and later the Alawis), Lebanon, and Syria remain important themes 
in your research interests. Why direct your gaze at the marginal?
Dick: I am concerned with the—so to speak—“multicultural drama” ac-
companying the demise of the Ottoman Commonwealth; how eth-
nic, linguistic, and religious plurality 
became increasingly tested by forces 
of colonialism and post-colonialism, by 
the market, and, most of all, by various 
brands of nationalism. Differences in 
ways of life, religious convictions ap-
peared to have been less problematic 
in the early modern era, certainly when 
compared to more recent conditions 
in the successor national states. What 
interests me is the process in which 
traditions and ways of interaction be-
tween people become problematized 
and politicized through the discourses 
of colonialism, nationalism and, more 
recently, Islamism. As a consequence 
some people feel less at home than 
they used to. In some way this is related 
to what we witness now globally, in debates about identity, conduct, 
and visibility of minority communities. It is not at all restricted to the 
Middle East but one can find it in Europe, and in particular, in the 
Netherlands. It is the majority that critically evaluates the conduct 
of others with their own principles and ideals—and not necessarily 
their actual behaviour—as is the case in the Netherlands, the result 
is that for an individual Muslim it is difficult to feel at ease and to 
express oneself freely. 
Martijn: Your work is mostly historical. Do we need the historical per-
spective in order to understand current developments?
Dick: It is useful to reconsider earlier experiences as well as uses of 
the past. For instance, when one works with a historical perspec-
tive one immediately sees the rapid changes in the public debate; 
in the Netherlands, the initial positive approach of multiculturalism 
was faded out by severe criticism within the span of only a few years. 
A historical perspective is, in my opinion, also important for ISIM to 
keep in mind, because every group acts and develops action based 
on historical experiences, at the least generational but often span-
ning longer cycles. Moreover, the use of the past offers rich avenues 
for research. Within religion it is often habitual to refer to historic 
precedent. This is also true for Islam. For example, a century ago the 
paradigm of the prophet Muhammad evolved primarily around ritual 
and pious behaviour, aspects that have remained of great concern for 
practising Muslims. However, within that century he has assumed an 
ever more political role and his quality as a man of state has gained 
considerable strength.
From Newsletter to Review
Martijn: Apart from your involvement with organizational matters, 
your main contribution to the ISIM enterprise was as editor of the 
ISIM Newsletter/Review. What shaped the ISIM Newsletter?
Dick: The first ISIM Newsletter was the combined effort of a very small 
team that had to deliver a product in only three months to accom-
pany the formal opening of the Institute. The opening was in October 
1998 but I was actually involved, with others, in the bringing about 
of the institute from 1996 onwards. The ISIM Newsletter has contin-
ued to rely on the exceptional skills and commitment of people like 
Gabrielle Constant in the early days and later on also Noel Lambert, 
Linda Herrera and, of course, Dennis Janssen. ISIM and the ISIM News-
letter were always meant as a platform to stimulate a more diverse 
scientific discourse on research in social, political, and religious proc-
esses. First of all we wanted to demonstrate through the articles in 
the Newsletter that a religious life is actually a very normal life; when 
looking at religion, religious movements, religious conduct, one al-
Media & Representation
Interview Dick Douwes
Resisting Uniformity
1
Now, more than ever, with Islamic voices
contesting politics, culture and society in prac-
tically every country with a Muslim population,
Islam would appear to have a unity and a com-
mon purpose across political and cultural fron-
tiers: to provide a common identity for Mus-
lims who wish to live in a society of their faith
and be ruled by their sacred law. This picture
can only confirm in the public mind the idea of
Islam as a common essence of all these soci-
eties, one that rules and determines their cul-
ture and their social and political processes. 
The views asserting the uniqueness, unity
and exceptionalism of Muslim society and his-
tory are all the more potent in the current
intellectual climate which has seen the demise
of universalist theories of historical causation
and social analysis such as Marxism. The idea
of cultural and civilizational essences and iden-
tities underlying unique histories of particular
civilizations have been most prominently stat-
ed in Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civiliza-
tions’ thesis. Even though this has been widely
criticized, the assumptions behind it are equal-
ly widely held, not least by many Muslim and
Arab intellectuals.
Muslim exceptionalism and uniqueness and
the centrality of religion to Muslim society and
history are, of course, the pillars of Islamist
political advocacy. Many ‘secular’ intellectuals,
specially in Egypt, while challenging Islamist
illiberal interpretations, would, nevertheless,
wish to base their own advocacies on ‘authen-
tic’ Muslim and Arab ‘culture’. Many advocates
of Human Rights, for instance, insist on deriv-
ing these rights from liberal (and strained)
interpretations of the Qu'ran and the tradi-
tions. I have encountered strong hostility to
my argument that the modern discourses of
Human Rights are products of recent political
struggles and ideologies, many of them
against the establishments of state, church
and dominant classes, and which have no
ancestry in the much older ethical and legal
discourses of any religion.
What is unique about Islam? I argue, along-
side many colleagues, against this cultural
essentialization of an exceptional ‘Islamic
world’, contrasted implicitly or explicitly with
an equally exceptional and totalized ‘West’. Of
course, every history is unique. The conceptual
tools of social and historical analyses are how-
ever common, and are used to analyse diverse
unique histories. The question also arises of
what is the object whose unique history is
being told? Does ‘Islamic society’ constitute a
unitary entity with a common and consistent
history extending to the present and underly-
ing the current ‘Islamic phenomenon’? Many
eminent writers such as the historian H.A.R.
Gibb and the anthropologist and philosopher
Ernest Gellner, have advanced arguments to
that effect. These arguments are the products
of deep scholarship and often thorough famili-
arity with the histories and cultures of the
region. The question however is conceptual:
the essentialism rests on a totalization of histo-
ries and societies as ‘Islamic’. This label cannot
be denied: yet, what commonality does it
entail? It can be argued for instance, that the
modern history (from the eighteenth century)
of Iran shows a totally different political and
social structure to that of Turkey or Egypt, let
alone Arabia. It can be plausibly argued that
the Christian and Muslim shores of the
Mediterranean shared many common features
of popular culture: Tunisian coastal cities had
more in common with Sicily and the Italian
south than with Arabia or Iraq. The manifest
reality, for instance, of women in southern
Europe covering their heads in a similar man-
ner to their Mediterranean Muslim counter-
parts seems to have escaped the notice of
observers intent on totalized contrasts!
Indeed, we can date the divergence from pre-
vious common elements between the two
shores of the Mediterranean to the second half
of the twentieth century as many Muslim
Mediterranean cities, such as Alexandria or
Algiers, became ‘peasantized’ by the great
rural influx, and European Mediterranean cities
increasingly integrated into a national culture
dominated by the North, a process accelerated
by the regional policies of the European Com-
munity.
I still have to deal with the question of what
it is that lends credence to the essentialist
arguments: what is the common denominator
which makes diverse societies Muslim beyond
the obvious fact of religion? Perhaps a good
way of answering this question is by drawing
parallels with European Christianity. The Chris-
tian world shares a universe of discourse refer-
ring to sets of institutions, doctrines and per-
sonnel: the church, the priesthood, the Holy
Trinity, the Bible, the problems of salvation and
grace. These are not restricted to the religious
sphere but have involved many spheres of cul-
ture, law, morality and family. Divorce, homo-
sexuality and abortion, for instance, continue
to be issues in the politics of several Western
countries. A good historian of Europe will tell
you however, that these entities of Church,
scriptures, law and so on, have taken vastly dif-
ferent forms and social significance at various
points in European history and in different
regions. The Medieval Catholic Church, for
instance, was a very different institution from
the eighteenth century Church and with a very
different role in society and politics.
Similarly, we find in Islam a common set of
vocabularies referring to institutions, doctrines
and personnel: the Qu'ran and Hadith (tradi-
tions of the Prophet), the ulama, the Sharica
(religious law) and many others. These have
similarly varying structures, forms of organiza-
tion and social significance over the centuries
and in different societies. Ernest Gellner in his
characterization of a constant pattern of Mus-
lim history and society, attributes a central role
to the ulama and the Sharica. His model, how-
ever, crumbles before the many different
forms of ulama organization, power, and insti-
tutions, not only in different societies and his-
tories but even within the class structure of the
same society. The elite ulama of late Ottoman
times, for instance, were integrated into the
ruling institutions and bureaucracies, while
their Iranian counterparts of the same time
constituted parts of local, decentralized power
elites with their own revenues and institutions
separate from the govenment. Both were dis-
tinct from the ulama ‘proletariat’ of their own
time, the multitude of students, preachers,
dervishes and mendicants, performing ser-
vices for the poor. Similarly, Sufism and sufi
brotherhoods, regular features of practically all
Muslim societies display a great variety of
manifestation and of relations to the main-
stream religious institutions, from elite intel-
lectual mystics counting the higher ulama in
their ranks, to illiterate rural charismatic saints
ruling peasant communities with magic, medi-
cine and ceremony.
And how do we understand these social for-
mations and their historical and geographical
variations and transformations, the logic of
their coherence and contradiction? Well, by
the same repertoire of social and historical
concepts and analyses which we use for West-
ern or any other societies. It is by these means
that we grasp the uniqueness of each manifes-
tation, not of a totalized history with an Islamic
essence.
Finally, does the current ‘Islamic resurgence’
vindicate the essentialist position that Islam
remains the essence of Muslim society, which
is peculiarly resistant to secularization and to
separating religion from politics? I am more
convinced by the opposite argument: that cur-
rent political Islam is partly a reaction and a
defence against the secularizing processes
that have inevitably come with modernity and
which continue to have their effect on all soci-
eties in the region. Law, even where elements
of religion have remained within it, has
become codified state law, subject to political
and social exigencies; education has been
largely removed from religious spheres and
authorities (that is why these authorities are
trying, in vain, to hang on); religious authori-
ties cannot, try as they may, control the mani-
fold channels of information and entertain-
ment of the modern media; modern economic
exigencies have forced women into the labour
market and the public spheres, subverting
patriarchal authority and traditional values
(associated with religion). Only in a society so
thoroughly destroyed by successive wars such
as Afghanistan can the religious reactionaries
succeed in reversing these inexorable process-
es. Saudi Arabia, where wealth from petrol has
partly exempted the authorities from the exi-
gencies of modern socio-economic processes,
has also partly succeeded in arresting these
trends, but for how long? In Iran, the ‘mullocra-
cy’ of the Islamic Republic has had to retreat
repeatedly (but discreetly) in the face of these
contingencies. Family planning, for instance,
initially denounced by Khomeini as contrary to
Islam and an imperialist measure against Mus-
lims, was restored after a few years as govern-
ment policy. Family law, after initial reversals,
has now restored most of the Shah’s reforms
and more. Regarding working women, the
level of employment in the work force was
mostly maintained, and there is increasing par-
ticipation of women in public life, politics, the
arts, sport and even as junior judges. Crucially,
Khomeini, faced with the exigencies of gover-
nance, ruled in 1988 that in the interests of the
whole Islamic Umma, the Islamic government
is empowered to suspend any provision of the
Sharica, including prayer and fasting! Since
then the category of ‘interest’ (maslaha) has
been written into the constitution and institu-
tionalized, opening the gates wide for prag-
matic legislation and policy. I rest my case.♦
Dr Sami Zubaida is a reader in Politics,
Department of Politics and Sociology,
Birkbeck College, University of London.
It is often claimed that Islam is not only a religion but a
culture and a civilization. ‘The Islamic world’ and ‘Islam-
ic history’ are commonly used terms, both in popular
public discourse and in academic writing, suggesting
some kind of coherent unity. At the same time, writers
point to the diversity of Muslim countries from Morocco
to Indonesia, from Nigeria to Turkey. Is there a unity
behind the diversity, at least in the ‘heartlands’ of Islam
in the Middle East and North Africa, as Ernest Gellner
and others have claimed?
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After a career of seven years as Academic 
Coordinator (later Executive Director) and 
Editor of the ISIM Newsletter/Review, Dick 
Douwes now joins the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam as Chair of History of Non-Western 
Societies and Dean of Faculty of History 
and Arts. In this interview he talks about his 
research interests, the building of ISIM, and 
the development of the ISIM Newsletter into 
the ISIM Review. One of his growing concerns is 
over what he sees to be an increasing pressure 
to conform to the “acceptable,” which allows 
for very little chance for the expression of 
authentic identities; a regrettable development 
that he witnesses not only in the Middle 
East but also in Europe, and in particular, 
the Netherlands.
ISIM Newsletter 1, 
October 1998
